Applications of formal verification for secure Cloud environments at CEA LIST

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Outline

Frama-C, a platform for analysis of C code

Verification of a Cloud hypervisor
  Anaxagoros hypervisor and Virtual Memory
  Formal Verification
  Results and discussion

Verification of a sandbox
  The ZeroVM sandbox solution
  Formal verification
  Results

Conclusion
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Frama-C, a brief history

- 90’s: CAVEAT, Hoare logic-based tool for C code at CEA
- 2000’s: CAVEAT used by Airbus during certification process of the A380 (DO-178 level A qualification)
- 2008: First public release of Frama-C (Hydrogen)
- 2012: New Hoare-logic based plugin WP developed at CEA LIST
- Today: Frama-C Sodium (v.11)
  - Multiple projects around the platform
  - A growing community of users...
  - and of plugin developers
Frama-C at a glance

- A Framework for Modular Analysis of C code
- Developed at CEA LIST and INRIA Saclay
- Released under LGPL license
- Kernel based on CIL [Necula et al. (Berkeley), CC 2002]
- ACSL annotation language
- Extensible plugin oriented platform
  - Collaboration of analyses over same code
  - Inter plugin communication through ACSL formulas
  - Adding specialized plugins is easy

ACSL: ANSI/ISO C Specification Language

- Based on the notion of contract, like in Eiffel, JML
- Allows users to specify functional properties of programs
- Allows communication between various plugins
- Independent from a particular analysis

Basic Components

- First-order logic
- Pure C expressions
- C types \( + \mathbb{Z} \) (integer) and \( \mathbb{R} \) (real)
- Built-in predicates and logic functions
Example: a C program annotated in ACSL

```c
/*@ requires n>=0 && valid(t+(0..n-1));
assigns nothing;
ensures result !== 0 <=>
( forall integer j; 0 <= j < n ==> t[j] == 0);
*/
int all_zeros(int t[], int n) {
    int k;
   /*@ loop invariant 0 <= k <= n;
    loop invariant forall integer j; 0<=j<k ==> t[j] == 0;
    loop assigns k;
    loop variant n-k;
    */
    for(k = 0; k < n; k++)
        if (t[k] != 0)
            return 0;
    return 1;
}
```

Can be proven in Frama-C/WP
Main Frama-C plugins
Frama-C, a platform for analysis of C code

Plugin WP for deductive verification

- Based on **Weakest Precondition** calculus [Dijkstra, 1976]
- **Proves** that a given program respects its specification
- Relies on
  - automatic provers (Alt-Ergo, CVC4, Z3, ...) 
  - when necessary, interactive proof assistants (Coq)
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Anaxagoros Microkernel

- Clouds mutualize physical resources between users
  - Safety and security are crucial
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- Anaxagoros
  - Secure microkernel hypervisor
  - Developed at CEA LIST by Matthieu Lemerre
  - Designed for resource isolation and protection

- Virtual memory system is a key module to ensure isolation
Virtual Memory Subsystem

- Organizes program address spaces
  - Creates a hierarchy of pages
  - Allows sharing when needed
- Controls accesses and modifications to the pages
  - Only owners can access their pages
  - Types of the pages limit possible actions
- Counts mappings, references, to each page
Memory invariant for sequential version

- Maintain the counters of mappings to pages:
  - The counter $mappings[e]$ must be equal to the real number of mappings to the page $e$
  - Let $Occ^e$ be the number of mappings, i.e. occurrences of $e$ in all pagetables

- We want to prove:

$$\forall e, validpage(e) \Rightarrow Occ^e = mappings[e] \leq MAX$$
Memory invariant for concurrent version

Concurrency issues

- Pages might be modified by different processes simultaneously
- That creates a gap between the actual number of mappings and the counter

New invariant:

\[ \forall e, \text{validpage}(e) \Rightarrow \text{Occ}^e \leq \text{mappings}[e] \leq \text{MAX} \]

and more precisely,

\[ \forall e, \text{validpage}(e) \Rightarrow \exists k. \ k \geq 0 \land \text{Occ}^e + k = \text{mappings}[e] \leq \text{MAX} \]

Here \( k \) is the number of threads that have introduced a difference in the counter, difference of at most 1.
Simulation of the concurrency

- To model the execution context, we introduce for each thread:
  - global arrays representing the value of each local variable
  - a global array representing its position in the execution

- We simulate every atomic step with a function that performs this step for one thread

- We create an infinite loop that randomly chooses a thread and makes it perform a step of execution according to its current position
Verification results

- Partial verification of a critical module of Anaxagoros hypervisor

- For low-level functions, we conducted a “classic” verification
  - Specification with ACSL
  - Automatic proof with Frama-C/WP and SMT Solvers (CVC4, Z3)

- For the concurrent function used to change pagetables:
  - First specification and proof for sequential version
  - Weakening of the invariant for concurrency
  - Specification and proof of the simulated version

- Only a few properties could not be proved automatically
  - their proof is done in Coq by extracting them from WP
Lessons Learned, Limitations and Benefits

- Ability to treat concurrent programs
  - With a tool that originally does not handle parallelism
  - Proof done mostly automatically
  - Verification of properties in isolation

- Scalability
  - By-hand simulation is tedious and error prone
  - Could perfectly be automatized
  - Need for specification mean for concurrent behaviors
Verification of a sandbox

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ZeroVM: History

- Developed by Google as a sandboxing technique for Chrome (2009)
- Native Client (NaCl) plugins use Chrome API
- ZeroVM: programs outside Chrome use ZeroVM syscalls (2011)
ZeroVM: Big picture

OS

untrusted
ZeroVM: Big picture

- Prevents privacy issues, privilege escalation, unauthorized device access...
ZeroVM: Big picture

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- Performs binary code validation before execution
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- Checks API calls (used for syscall invocations)
Verification of ZeroVM

Specification in ACSL and deductive verification with Frama-C/WP of API checks before syscall invocation:

```c
/*@ 
requires valid_nap(nap);
ensures valid_nap(nap);
@*/

int32_t TrapHandler(struct NaClApp *nap, 
                     uint32_t* args){
...
}
```
API handler for validation of Read operations

```c
static int32_t ZVMReadHandle(
    struct NaClApp *nap,
    int ch, char *buffer,
    int32_t size, int64_t offset)
{
    ...
}
```

Checks performed by ZVMReadHandle:
- `ch` channel exists
- `buffer` is writable on size length
- `[offset; offset+size] ⊂ [0; channel->size]`
- limits are not reached
API handler for validation of memory accesses

/*@  
requires valid_nap(nap);
requires nap->mem_start <= start;
assigns \nothing;
ensures \result == 0 ==> prot == PROT_READ ==>  
valid_read_segment(start,start+size);
ensures \result == 0 ==> prot == PROT_WRITE ==>  
valid_segment(start,start+size);
ensures \result == 0 || \result == -1;
@*/

static int CheckRAMAccess(struct NaClApp *nap,  
NaClSysPtr start, uint32_t size, int prot)
Issues detected by formal verification (1/3)

before correction:

```c
int64_t size; uintptr_t start, nap->mem_map[i].end;

size -= (nap->mem_map[i].end - start);
if(size <= 0) return 0;
```

after correction:

```c
if(size <= (nap->mem_map[i].end - start)) return 0;
size -= nap->mem_map[i].end - start ;
```
Issues detected by formal verification (1/3)

before correction:

```c
int64_t size; uintptr_t start, nap->mem_map[i].end;
size -= (nap->mem_map[i].end - start);
if(size <= 0) return 0;
```

after correction:

```c
if(size <= (nap->mem_map[i].end - start)) return 0;
size -= nap->mem_map[i].end - start;
```
Before correction:

```c
int32_t size, int64_t offset;
int64_t channel->size;

/* prevent reading beyond the end of the channel */
size = MIN(channel->size - offset, size);

/* check arguments sanity */
if(size == 0)
    return 0; /* success. user has read 0 bytes */
if(size < 0) return -EFAULT;
if(offset < 0) return -EINVAL;
```
Issues detected by formal verification (2/3)

after correction:

```c
/* check offset sanity */
if(offset < 0 || offset >= channel->size)
    return -EINVAL;

/* prevent reading beyond the end of the channel */
size = MIN(channel->size - offset, size);

/* check arguments sanity */
if(size == 0)
    return 0; /* success. user has read 0 bytes */
if(size < 0) return -EFAULT;
```
Issues detected by formal verification (3/3)

before correction:

```c
if (offset >= channel->size + tail) return -EINVAL;
```

after correction:
Issues detected by formal verification (3/3)

before correction:

```c
if(offset >= channel->size + tail) return -EINVAL;
```

after correction:

```c
if(offset >= channel->size &&
    offset - channel->size >= tail) return -EINVAL;
```
Verification results

- Frama-C/WP automatically proves specified properties
  - 64 proof obligations for functional properties
  - 69 proof obligations to prevent runtime errors

- several issues and potential security flaws detected and reported to the development team

- a new version of ZeroVM fixed the issues
Conclusion

We performed deductive verification in Frama-C for
- a submodule of a Cloud hypervisor
- a sandbox for secure execution of user applications

Results:
- a concurrent version verified via simulation
- a few potential errors and security flaws detected and reported
- Frama-C provides a rich and extensible framework for formal verification of C code

Future work:
- apply Frama-C for formal verification of real-sized Cloud software